A Prescription for Teaching the Law of Reasonable Religious and Disability Accommodation by Stone, Kerri Lynn
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 2 Spring Article 8 
2018 
A Prescription for Teaching the Law of Reasonable Religious and 
Disability Accommodation 
Kerri Lynn Stone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/benefits 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the 
Legal Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stone, Kerri Lynn (2018) "A Prescription for Teaching the Law of Reasonable Religious and Disability 
Accommodation," Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/benefits/vol19/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review by an authorized editor of 
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu. 
A PRESCRIPTION FOR TEACHING THE LAW OF 
REASONABLE RELIGIOUS AND DISABILITY 
ACCOMMODATION 
Kerri Lynn Stone• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ ... ..... . .. ...... 248 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................... ..... ..... .... .. .. . 248 
III. PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH ................................... .... .... .. ..... . 250 
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 263 
• Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New 
York University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. I 
would also like to thank my research assistant, Cori Ann Varsallone for all of her 
assistance, as well as my husband, Josh Stone, and my children, Dylan Stone, and 
Marlee Stone, for making the experience of writing this piece possible and fun. 
247 
248 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has perhaps never been more important than it is now for 
law professors to exhort their students to evaluate the tensions 
that emerge when assertions of religious liberty come into 
conflict with competing interests like societal welfare, civil 
rights, or third party interests. As a professor of Employment 
Law and Employment Discrimination Law, I familiarize my 
students with the claims that may be brought by employees in a 
variety of scenarios in which they are alleging religious 
discrimination, asserting a right to a reasonable accommodation, 
or otherwise affected by someone else's claim of the same. The 
adjudication of these claims, whether brought pursuant to the 
U.S. Constitution,1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 or 
another statute, necessitates an evaluation of the relative weight 
to be accorded to the interests on both sides. 
I also teach my students about allegations of employers' 
disability discrimination and failure to reasonably accommodate 
an employee's disability under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), which mandates a reasonable accommodation for an 
otherwise qualified disabled employee.3 This short piece details 
an approach that I have taken toward teaching the concept of 
reasonable accommodation across contexts, while noting the 
critical differences between the standards applied, the policy and 
other considerations at issue under each statute, and the 
legislative and jurisprudential goals at stake in each scenario. It 
lays out the materials that I introduce as well as the approach 
that I take. 
II.BACKGROUND 
Title VII renders it "an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or 
employment, because of such individual's ... religion," among 
other protected classes. 4 Section 2000eG) of Title VII defines the 
term "religion" as including "all aspects of religious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate ... [a] religious 
1. See generally U.S. Const. amend. I. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1964). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112a-b (2012). 
4. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
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observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer's business."5 
The ADA, for its part, prohibits an employer from 
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability 
•••• " 6 The Act goes so far as to define "discrimination" as 
including an employer's "not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified ... employee, unless [the employer] can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of [its] business."7 As per the EEOC, 
"an accommodation is any change in the work environment or in 
the way things are customarily done that enables an individual 
with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities."8 
There are three types of reasonable accommodations.9 The first 
type is a "modification• or adjustment• to a job application 
process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be 
considered for the position such qualified applicant desires."10 
The second type consists of "modifications or adjustments to the 
work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under 
which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that 
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the 
essential functions of that position."11 The third type consists of 
"modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's 
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated 
employ-..:es without disabilities."12 
Examples of reasonable accommodations in the ADA 
include: making existing facilities accessible; job restructuring; 
part-time or modified work schedules; acquiring or modifying 
equipment; changing tests, training materials, or policies; 
providing qualified readers or interpreters; and reassignment to 
a vacant position.13 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
8. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable 
Accommodations and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
(2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/67RF-
LXT3] [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(i) (1997)). 
11. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (1997)). 
12. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(iii) (1997)). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i-ii) (1997). 
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Interestingly, whereas under Title VII, the "undue 
hardship" defense has been read as a demonstration that the 
proposed accommodation inflicts more than a "de minimis" cost 
or burden on the employer,14 the ADA's undue hardship analysis 
asks whether the employer is forced to incur a "significant 
difficulty or expense."15 
Both analyses involve competing interests and a holistic 
evaluation of the job at the employing entity, in terms of both 
what it does and does not necessarily entail. 16 Obviously, when 
it comes to a reasonable accommodation mandate, wholesale 
deference to either side's framing of what is reasonable to ask for 
and what the essential functions of the position are would beg 
the question, so a court must delve into these fact-intensive 
queries with a searching, self-directed approach.17 At the end of 
the day, the statutes will operate to compel change and 
adjustment in some cases, but not in others, and these changes 
will potentially impact not only the employee and employer, but 
third parties, like co-workers, customers, and society as a 
whole.18 Adjudicating reasonable accommodation claims in any 
context thus necessitates, I believe, a step back to ask the larger 
question of what we aim to accomplish, for example, when we 
allow a statute or other law to be successfully wielded by an 
employee seeking an accommodation that will enable her to do 
her job. It is important, when teaching antidiscrimination law, 
that each statute's objectives, limitations, and capabilities be 
explored, both individually and, in comparison with one another, 
to solidify and cement understanding. 
Ill. PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH 
Any discussion of reasonable accommodation 1s best 
14. See e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66, 84 (1977) ("To 
require an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [employee 
his Sabbath day] off is an undue hardship .... "). 
15. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Md., 923 F. Supp. 720, 740 (D. Md. 1996); 
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 8; see also Pamela S. Karlan & George 
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 7 (1996) (acknowledging that unlike the narrow interpretation of what 
constitutes an "undue hardship" by the Court in TWA, "[r]easonable accommodation 
... means something very different in the context of disabilities law .... "). 
16. Stephen Gee, The "Moral Hazards" of Title VII's Religious Accommodation 
Doctrine, 89 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1131, 1138-39 (2014). 
17. Id. at 1147. 
18. Id. at 1156, 1158. 
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grounded in the policy surrounding the law itself (statutes 
mandating nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation) 
and the competing interests of those potentially affected by 
another's accommodation, whether that be a colleague, a client 
or patient of the employer, or the general public.19 To the extent 
that case law and legislative history d,o not amply delve into the 
tensions engendered by these competing rights, interests, and 
considerations, legal scholarship is helpful as well.20 What is the 
precise nature of the relationship between an accommodation 
that is simply not reasonable and one that confers an undue 
hardship on an employer? What is the evidentiary threshold 
and proper considerations when establishing either one? 
Much has been made over the fact that the reasonable 
accommodation provision afforded to private employees alleging 
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII has, 
traditionally, been read as somewhat narrower and conferring 
less upon these plaintiffs than, for example, the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the ADA.21 My class typically covers 
the ADA after we have covered Title VII, so when students 
confront the reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA, it 
is not the first time that they are examining the analysis, theory, 
19. Trans World Airlines, 423 U.S. at 85 ("[T]he paramount concern of Congress 
in enacting Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in employment." Thus, 
"[i]n the absence of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, we 
will not readily construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against 
some employees in order to enable others to obserue their Sabbath.") (emphasis 
added). 
20. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 11-12 (analyzing the contours of 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship); Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a 
Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" 
Under the American with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 433 (1995) 
(analyzing the undue hardship under the ADA); Russel H. Gardner & Carolyn J. 
Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to the Reasonable Accommodation 
Requirement of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 7 LAB. L. 37, 37-38 (1991) 
(analyzing the relationship of the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
defense); Harvey S. Mars, An Oueruiew of Title I of the American With Disabilities 
Act and its Impact Upon Federal Labor Law, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 251, 259-66 
(1995) (analyzing both the reasonable accommodation requirement and the undue 
hardship defense of the ADA); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty to 
Accommodate Employee Religious Practices Under Title Vll A~er Ansonia u. Board of 
Education u. Philbrook, 50 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 513 (1989) (analyzing the relationship 
between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in the religious context); 
Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAA, 14 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. P0L'Y 509, 513-14 (2011); Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: 
An Examination of the Different Application's of the Reasonable-Accommodation 
Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745, 762 (1998). 
21. Zablotsky, supra note 20, at 534. 
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or jurisprudence of reasonable accommodation in the workplace. 
By the time we get to the reasonable accommodation portion of 
the ADA, I am anxious to remind the students about Title VII 
and ask them about the treatment of reasonable accommodation 
across the two statutes. What follows are some of the topics, 
questions, and approache$ that guide our ensuing discussion, as 
well as some of the sources and materials that I use. 
Once we have looked at some reasonable accommodation 
cases in both contexts, we discuss how representative cases 
provide data points that help to contour dividing lines and even 
implicit standards embedded in the jurisprudence.22 With a 
sense of how the lines tend to be drawn slightly more generously 
when it comes to affording reasonable accommodations to 
employees under the ADA, we proceed to backtrack to the mere 
fact that religion, and no other protected class is afforded 
accommodation. I touch upon, briefly, the notion that other 
protected classes, like race, sex, and national origin, have 
generated discussion of why reasonable accommodation may be 
beneficial,23 and the fact that only discrimination ''because of' 
religion has been defined by Title VII as failing to grant a 
reasonable accommodation. 24 
I encourage my students to think about what distinguishes 
religion from other protected classes. We discuss the First 
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.25 We 
also discuss how the passage of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and the special tax status afforded religious 
institutions illustrates how pervasively the U.S. government 
privileges religion across contexts, seeming to consider it (pardon 
the pun) sacrosanct and special, even vis-a-vis other protected 
class statuses.26 As Professor Stanley Fish has said: 
22. Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and 
the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 389-90 (2008). 
23. Id. at 418 ("propos[ing] that employers be required to provide 
accommodation for appearance traits that an employee (or applicant) claims signal 
identification with a subgroup recognized by Title VII, such as race, sex, or national 
origin."); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom 
and Antidiscrimination. Norms, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 n.366 (2007) ("Although 
scholars sometimes assume that the antidiscrimination rules of Title VII and 
accommodation mandates are fundamentally different, . . . the two overlap in 
important respects and that certain aspects of Title VII, including its disparate 
impact prong, sometimes require accommodation."); Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 667 (2001). 
24. Gee, supra note 16, at 1135. 
25. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
26. Gee, supra note 16, at 1139. 
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[B]y definition religion sees itself as above secular 
norms, although the issue of being exempt from those 
norms is a vexed one, occupying the territory 
between "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's" and 
"no one can serve two masters." The entire point of 
religion - at least of the theistic kind, Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam - is to affirm a fidelity to an 
authority and to a set of imperatives that exceed, and 
sometimes clash with, what is required by the state. 
The denial of religion's claim to be special is the 
denial of religion as an ultimate discourse, and is, in 
effect, the denial of religion as religion; it becomes 
just one more point of view.27 
What generally comes next is a side-by-side view of the ADA 
and Title VII. As one scholarly article recites: 
The . . . (ADA) differs fundamentally from Title 
VIL Both prohibit something called "discrimination," 
but discrimination under the ADA means something 
quite distinct from what it means under Title VIL 
Under Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
statutes, employers can safely make employment 
decisions if they ignore race and other protected 
statuses and focus solely on criteria related to 
productivity .... At issue here are the basic models of 
discrimination. The central thrust of Title VII 
employs a "sameness" model of discrimination, 
requiring employers to treat African Americans and 
women exactly the same as others; their race and sex 
must be ignored and employers must focus instead on 
factors related to productivity. Although the ADA 
uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive thrust 
is a "difference" model, requiring employers to treat 
individuals with disabilities differently and more 
favorably than others. Employers must treat 
individuals with disabilities as qualified if they "can 
perform the essential functions" of the job. Employers 
are free to treat others as qualified only if they can 
perform all of the functions of the job. Similarly, 
27. Stanley Fish, Is Religion Speci.al? N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 26, 2010), 
https://opinionator.bliogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/is-religion-special/?mcubz=3 
[https://perma.cdSV3M-L9EQ]. 
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employers must make "reasonable accommodations" 
for individuals with disabilities.28 
Thus, as the article concludes, when it comes to 
accommodation and deference, "[u]nder Title VII ... law, the 
employer defines the job as it wishes; Title VII merely insists 
that workers and applicants for those jobs be treated without 
regard to race or sex. The ADA goes beyond Title VII by 
requiring employers to restructure the jobs themselves."29 This 
is in keeping with the notion that the ADA aims to affirmatively 
level the playing field, while Title VII merely issues a 
nondiscrimination mandate.3° These differences, structural and 
substantive, are critical to grasp, and they form the baseline for 
the further analysis of reasonable accommodation. 
But taking students' thinking on these issues from abstract 
to concrete requires more specific examples. One that I have 
found particularly useful in class is to consider the plight of a 
specific employee in several different contexts and 
predicaments-a pharmacist. We thus consider the case of the 
pharmacist in need of accommodation. A Westlaw search of the 
word "pharmacist" within the same paragraph as "reasonable 
accommodation," which could be referring to a request made 
pursuant to Title VII or to the ADA, yields thirty-three results 
as of September 2017. In class, we consider the narrative of a 
pharmacist who may be working in any number of different 
work environments (small pharmacies, large chain pharmacies), 
in any part of the country (remote versus cosmopolitan, places 
where there may be greater diversity of beliefs or greater access 
to other pharmacies versus less), with any number of requests 
for accommodation, be they religion- or disability-based. By 
focusing on the pharmacist, and by envisioning her with any 
number of accommodation needs and in any number of 
professional settings, the operational rules that govern different 
types of employment discrimination scenarios are drawn into 
sharper focus. 
When the focus is on the mandate that employers afford 
employees reasonable religious accommodation under Title VII, 
attention naturally turns, as it does in many discussions of the 
assertion of religious liberty, to the tensions inherent in a 
28. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of 
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1197, 1199-1200 (2003). 
29. Id. at 1202. 
30. Id. at 1200. 
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scenario in which one person's assertion of religious liberty is 
seen as an incursion into other's (or society's) rights or 
interests.31 So, for example, a pharmacist may seek to be exempt 
from dispensing certain types of medications because doing so 
would conflict with her religious beliefs. This medication may 
include various forms of birth control, emergency contraception 
taken after intercourse to prevent a pregnancy, and hormone-
blocking drugs taken by transsexuals in the midst of 
transitioning. This exemption would require the provision of 
this medication by another willing employee when the employee 
is on duty. Under the precepts of Title VII jurisprudence, the 
requested exemption would be evaluated as a proposed 
reasonable accommodation, and the pharmacist's employer 
would need to argue that the accommodation is not reasonable, 
but rather that it confers an undue burden on it. 32 
In any event, the ensuing analysis is fact-intensive. 
Typically, courts adjudicating the issue of reasonable religious 
accommodations factor into their analyses things like the costs 
imposed on the employer by the accommodation and its relative 
ability to defray those costs,33 whether the employer would have 
to violate its own clearly established seniority system, as well as 
harms of various sorts that may be conferred on third parties or 
society at large as a result of the accommodation. 34 Thus, it may 
very well be the case that a pharmacist with essentially the 
31. See e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85-86 (1977). 
32. See e.g. U.S. v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (discussing the different defenses to alleging failure to reasonably 
accommodate). 
33. See e.g., Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 69 (taking into consideration the 
fact that allowing the employee to work four days a week and observe Sabbath, 
would have, among other things, required TWA to employ someone not regularly 
assigned to work Saturdays and pay premium wages); see also Bd. of Educ. for Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 887 (acknowledging that the sort of ''de minimis cost" 
addressed is usually economic in nature); cf Enforcement Guidance, supra note 8 ("If 
there are two possible reasonable accommodations, and one costs more or is more 
burdensome than the other, the employer may choose the less expensive or 
burdensome accommodation as long as its effective .... "). 
34. See e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002) ( "[Ijn the 
context of a Title VII religious discrimination case, an employer need not adapt to an 
employee's special worship schedule as a 'reasonable accommodation' where doing so 
would conflict with the seniority rights of other employees."); Trans World Airlines, 
432 U.S. at 79 ("[W]e cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-
upon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommodate religious 
observances."); see also Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 894 (holding 
that a state statute prohibiting teachers from wearing religious garb in class did not 
violate the Muslim teacher's Title VII rights where the statute advanced a 
compelling state interest in maintaining appearance of religious neutrality). 
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same job description and title may fare differently when 
requesting that another pharmacist handle the provision of 
certain prescriptions because of anything from the location of the 
pharmacy, to its size, to its resources. 
However, some states have found the religious liberties at 
stake too vital to be denied in any event, and have passed so-
called "refusal clauses" or "conscience clauses," pieces of 
legislation initially enacted in the wake of Roe v. Wade,36 which 
rendered unenforceable all state laws that outlawed abortion 
because they were seen to violate a constitutional right to 
privacy.36 These conscience clauses initially permitted doctors 
and other health care providers to refuse to perform or assist in 
an abortion.37 Now, some states have passed versions that 
afford pharmacists the right to refuse to engage in the provision 
of certain services and the dispensing of certain prescription 
drugs when doing so would violate individual religious beliefs.38 
In both 2014 and 2016, Senator Cory Booker introduced the 
"Access to Birth Control Act" bill,39 which would compel all 
pharmacists in the United States to dispense emergency 
contraception, but there is a great deal of resistance to what 
many see as a trammeling of the right to abide by one's 
conscience while retaining one's job.40 Presently, several states, 
including Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, and Idaho have enacted 
laws permitting pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency 
contraception drugs.41 Without explicitly naming pharmacists, 
other states, including Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and 
Tennessee have enacted more general conscience clauses. 42 
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit upheld as constitutional 
Washington State's rules requiring a pharmacy to deliver or 
dispense drugs, and including secular but not religious 
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, Pharmacist Con.science Clauses: Laws and Information (May 2012), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/pharmacist-conscience-clauses-laws-and-
information.aspx [https://perma.cc/CK6P-JU99] [hereinafter "Pharmacist Conscience 
Clauses'']. 
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
37. See Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35. 
38. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-304(4)-(5) (2012) (allowing physicians and 
pharmacists to refuse to provide contraceptive procedures or supplies); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 25-6-102(7), (9) (2018). 
39. See S. 2960, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); see also H.R. 2567, 115th Cong. (2017-
2018) (Access to Birth Control Act filed by Rep. Maloney, Carolyn B.). 
40. See Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35. 
41. Pharmacist Con.science Clauses, supra note 35. 
42. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35. 
2018] RELIGION AND DISABILITY ACCOMODATION 257 
exemptions.43 According to the Court: 
We recognize that there is a "trend of protecting 
conscientious objectors to abortions," . . . and that 
most-but not all-states do not require pharmacies 
to deliver prescriptions, such as Plan B and ella, in a 
timely manner. On balance, however, we are 
unconvinced that the right to own, operate, or work 
at a licensed professional business free from 
regulations requiring the business to engage in 
activities that one sincerely believes leads to the 
taking of human life is "so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental." . . . Accordingly, we decline to 
recognize a new fundamental right. 44 
The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari, generating 
a strident dissent from Justice Alito, in which he declared the 
declination "ominous."45 This case was seen as contrasting 
interestingly with the sentiment of the Supreme Court in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,46 in which the Supreme 
Court allowed a for-profit, closely-held private corporation to 
claim an exemption based on the owners' religious convictions 
from a regulation adopted by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services under the Affordable Care Act.47 The 
regulation required employers to cover certain contraceptives for 
their female employees, and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
Stormans drew comparisons to the Supreme Court's opinion, 48 
with The Atlantic noting that "[o]n the surface, the Hobby Lobby 
and Stormans cases seem similar: Both involve private 
businesses whose religious owners object to laws requiring them 
to deal with contraception."49 The paper asked what had 
happened in those two years that made the Supreme Court 
43. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 {2016). 
44. Id. at 1087-88 (internal citations omitted). 
45. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 {2016) {Alito, J., dissenting). 
46. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
47. Id. at 2759. 
48. See Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1075 n.4. 
49. Emma Green, Euen Christian Pharmacists Haue to Stock Plan B, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jun. 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016 
/06/pharmacists-have-to-sell-emergency-contracptioneven-if-it-violates-their-
religious-beliefs/489182/ [https://perma.cc/9GVY-QRN9]. 
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change course so much since Hobby Lobby.so 
The obvious answer, of course, is the changes in the 
composition of the Supreme Court's membership.51 Even after 
Justice Scalia's death, the Court might have taken up the issue, 
since it only takes four Justices to procure a grant of certiorari. 52 
However, those who would support one might have feared that 
without a fifth vote to reverse, a four and four affITmance of the 
Ninth Circuit would have ensued.53 And, interestingly, only 
Justice Alito spoke out about the denial. 54 But was there also a 
combination of cultural, political, and other environmental 
changes that had changed the direction of the proverbial 
political winds on this issue? And it should be noted that we can 
never really draw broad conclusions from the Supreme Court's 
denial of certiorari. The Court will sometimes leave issues to 
percolate longer in the lower courts without voicing a clear 
opinion when the first opportunity presents itself. 
On one side, pharmacists' associations and religious 
liberties groups took up the mantle of the objecting pharmacists, 
both in the case and in the public debate.55 They argued that 
despite the centrality that had been accorded individual 
assertions of religious liberty and conviction by state laws, with 
an affirmative mandate like Washington's, the sheer inability of 
small pharmacies to accommodate individuals while abiding by 
the mandate could pose a threat to the continued employment of 
individual pharmacists.56 On the other side, groups like the 
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU') vehemently defended 
the rules requiring pharmacies to deliver/dispense drugs despite 
their owners' religious objections.57 They argued that a woman 
in need of some of the medications at issue might be dissuaded 
from using them or otherwise harmed if she were forced to seek 








57. Id.; Supreme Court Declines To Hear Case About Religious Pharmacy 
Turning Women Away, AMERICAN C.L. UNION (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/supreme-court-declines-hear-case-about-religious-
pharmacy-turning-women-away [https://perma.cc/BL8K-BUJ6] [hereinaRer 
"Supreme Court Declines".] 
58. Green, supra note 49; Supreme Court Declines, supra note 57. 
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It must also not be forgotten that the litigation in Hobby 
Lobby was brought under RFRA,59 whereas in Stormans, he 
brought a challenge to a state regulation, which could not have 
been litigated under RFRA.60 I encourage my students to 
question and debate whether, as Judge Alito intimated in his 
dissent from the denial of certiorari, religious liberty is under 
attack, or whether the public health concerns attendant to 
compelling the immediate availability of Plan B and similar 
drugs need to prevail.61 A similar debate took place in the 
United Kingdom ("UK'') recently, starting in December of 2016.62 
At that time, the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC), 
promulgated draft standards and guidance that inserted a "duty 
to dispense" where there had previously been a "right to refer."63 
This was termed a "significant change" by the GPhC. 64 The 
draft guidance generated a great deal of input from groups and 
individuals that centered around the competing interests of 
religious liberties on the part of some and public health and 
access to prescriptions.65 On June 22, 2017, the final guidance 
issued stated that individual pharmacists would retain the 
prerogative to refer customers to see other pharmacists when 
they needed prescriptions filled for, among other things, 
abortifacient or hormone-blocking drugs. 66 
This material is a springboard into a discussion of the 
concept of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA and 
59. Green, supra note 49. 
60. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 n.4. 
61. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alita, J. 
dissenting). 
62. GEN. PHARMACEUTICAL COUNS., Consultation on Religi,on, Personal Values 
and Beliefs, (Dec. 2016), https://www.pharmacyregulation.org 
/sites/default/files/consu1tation_on_religion_personal_values_and_beliefs_decerober_2 
016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F94Z-SNT7] (hereinafter "Consultation on Religi,on"); see 
also Philippa Taylor, Good News for freedom of Conscience in the UK, CMF BLOG 
(June 26, 2017), http://www.cmtblog.org.uk/2017/06/26/good-news-for-freedom-of-
concious-in-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/A 7G4-H567]. 
63. Dr. Peter Saunders, Regulator's Proposal to Remove Pharmacists' 
Conscience Rights is Unethical, Unnecessary and Quite Possibly Rlegal, CMF BLOG 
(Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.cmflblog.org.uk/2017/02/21/regulators-proposal-to-
remove-pharmacists-conscience-rights-is-unethical-unneccesary-and-quite-possibly-
illegal/ [https://perma.cc/3XE7-KSC7]. 
64. Consultation on Religion, supra note 62. 
65. Saunders, supra note 63. 
66. GEN. PHARMACEUTICAL COUNS., In Practice: Guidance on Religion, Personal 
Values and Beliefs, (June 2017), 
https://www.pharmacyregulation.org/sites/default/files/in_practice_guidance_on_relig 
ion_personal_ values_and~beliefs. pdf (https://perma.cc/VB2Z-L98V]. 
260 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19.2 
under Title VII. 67 Drawn into sharper focus, the plight of the 
pharmacist who cannot perform all that is asked of her boils 
down largely to the workings of the respective statutes 
employed, their goals, and their construction by courts. 
Structurally, what is going on in each scenario is somewhat 
similar; Title VII and the ADA each seek to combat 
discrimination, often rational or for "economic reasons," and 
often in the form of a failure to accommodate.68 It is useful, 
though, to have students confronted with the pharmacist 
scenarios examine the discrimination being combated in each 
side by side and come to conclusions about the structures, 
objectives, and constructions of the statutes at play. 
Once we have reviewed religious discrimination claims 
potentially brought by a pharmacist, my class looks at the plight 
of the same pharmacist who seeks permission to .abstain from 
performing part of what would normally be considered part of 
her job duties, but this time, due to a disability. Fortunately, 
this kind of case has already come to court, so after we speculate 
about various hypothetical outcomes, we can look at some actual 
ones.69 
In 201 7, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Stevens 
v. Rite Aid Corp. that a pharmacist whose trypan phobia, or fear 
of needles, could not expect to be accommodated under the ADA 
by bypassing his employer's policy that required pharmacists to 
administer immunization injections to customers by having 
someone else perform that part of his job for him. 70 
Immunizations, however, were listed in Rite Aid's job description 
for its pharmacists as one of their "essential duties and 
responsibilities" for pharmacists. 71 According to the court, the 
plaintiff was not properly deemed, as the statute required him to 
be to claim relief, a "qualified individual" who, "with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires."72 The court held that it was compelled to find that the 
immunization injections were an essential job requirement for 
67. Gee, supra note 16, at 1140. 
68. Gee, supra note 16, at 1149. 
69. See e.g., Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 851 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2017). 
70. Id. at 228, 231. 
71. Id. at 229. 
72. Id. at 229 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012)). The court ultimately 
concluding that no 'juror could reasonably conclude that Stevens was 'qualified to 
perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation."' Id. at 231. 
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Rite Aid pharmacists.73 Specifically, the court found that the 
plaintiffs proposals "that Rite Aid could have either hired a 
nurse to give immunization injections for him or assigned him to 
a dual-pharmacist location do not propose true 
accommodations," because "[t]hose steps would be exemptions 
that would have involved other employees performing Stevens' 
essential immunization duties," and "Rite Aid was not required 
to grant Stevens these exemptions."74 
In Buser v. Eckerd Corp.,75 a federal district court in 2015 
looked at a similar claim by a pharmacist with Parkinson's 
disease who could not administer injections due to tremors that 
he experienced.76 The plaintiff there sought exemption from his 
employer's vaccination requirement, or, alternately, that he be 
furnished with an automatic injector to permit him to give 
injections without using an exposed needle. 77 The court 
determined that there was sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to 
survive summary judgment on, among other things, whether 
giving immunizations were an essential function of his job. 78 
"However, the court also held [that the] plaintiff failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence showing a reasonable accommodation existed, 
if immunization was determined to be an essential function of 
his job."79 
Interestingly, whereas there has been legislative 
intervention on the religious discrimination front, the few recent 
ADA cases brought by pharmacists have tended not to go the 
plaintiffs' way.80 We discuss what this means in terms of the 
law's treatment of religion, and in spite of the broader 
construction of the reasonable accommodation mandate in the 
ADA. Using the workplace of a pharmacy and these scenarios as 
a springboard, we will then discuss the differences between the 
law's provisions for and handling of religious discrimination as 
opposed to disability discrimination more broadly. I note for my 
students, that numerous scholars have observed that the 
73. Id. at 231. 
74. Id. ("Moreover, as the District Court noted, Stevens failed to show that a 
vacant position at a dual-pharmacist store existed at the time of his termination."). 
75. 2015 WL 1438618 (E.D.N.C. 2015). 




80, Denise Johnson, Why Claims Under American with Disabilities Act are 
Rising, INS. J. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
national/2016/10/07 /42877 4.htm [https://perma.cc/K8KN-8N99]. 
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reasonable accommodation mandate of Title VII has been 
construed more broadly in favor of employers than that of the 
ADA, 81 with some even calling for Title VII to be amended to 
adopt the ADA's more generous-to-plaintiffs reasonable 
accommodation provision.82 Stephen Gee, another scholar, 
however, disagrees starkly with this call, citing everything from 
the immutability of disability as opposed to religion to 
Establishment Clause impediments for the proposition. 83 Gee 
argues that "[t]he ADA is afforded a stronger accommodation 
standard, [and a] ... more preferential Title VII standard could 
be struck down in violation of the Establishment Clause due to 
the potential governmental entanglement with religion."84 
The fact of the matter is, however, that the two provisions 
in the two statutes guaranteeing entitlement to a "reasonable 
accommodation," have some stark differences between them, 85 
and my goal is always to see if I can elicit these differences from 
students as they study the two side-by-side. Despite the fact that 
both the ADA and Title VII were drafted and enacted to 
eradicate workplace discrimination against groups that would be 
particularly susceptible to and uniquely harmed by it, there is 
guidance stretching back a long way that would predicate 
divergent interpretations of terms like ''reasonable" or "undue 
hardship."86 
As stated, the centerpiece terms of the respective statutes, 
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" are to be 
81. Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to 
Provide Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 
ARK. L. REV. 515, 530---31 (2010); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., &ading Amendments and 
Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95 B.U.L. REV. 781, 797-98 (2015); Schuchman, 
supra note 20, at 754. 
82. Blair, supra note 81, at 530-31; Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and 
Third-Party Harms, 17 FEDERALIST Soc'y REV. 50, 58 (2016) ("consider, for example, 
the duty of reasonable accommodation of disabilities. The legislature should have as 
much latitude to protect religion as it has to protect these other important values."); 
see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of &ligion: An Update and A 
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992) (''The legislature 
should have as much latitude to protect the exercise of religion that it has to protect 
other important values in life .... Congress struck the balance in Title VII by 
requiring 'reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion],' short of 'undue hardship' to the employer-
the same statutory standard that it applies to accommo:lation of persons with 
disabilities."). 
83. Gee, supra note 16, at 1131. 
84. Id. at 1167. 
85. Id. at 1148. 
86. Id. at 1142. 
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construed quite differently.87 As one scholar has observed: 
Congress specifically rejected Hardison 's de 
minimis standard for the interpretation of "undue 
hardship" under the ADA, stating that the ADA 
requires a significantly higher standard than that 
created by the Supreme Court for Title VII. Second, 
religious beliefs (which reflect a choice) and 
disabilities (which do not) are fundamentally 
different "animals," so a law designed to protect one 
may not be a fully appropriate comparative 
instrument for the other. Thirdly, "disability'' carries 
a certain stigma that we initially may be reluctant to 
apply to religion, as many people consider disabled 
individuals to be substantially incapacitated by their 
disabilities and unable to participate in normal life 
activities. 88 
Each of these facets of the premise for the different 
construction informs and animates our discussion, but we 
discuss the fact-intensive nature of each case and how critical 
which jurisdiction a pharmacist works in can be, as everything 
from state-specific protections to benches differently poised on 
the issue of accommodation in any number of contexts can be 
determinative of what happens in a case or a challenge. Our 
class winds up with a discussion about societal and judicial 
attitudes toward religion and the protection of religious liberties 
and some projections about whether the status of things will 
change, and why. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After years of teaching the concept of "reasonable 
accommodation" in two different contexts at two different points 
in the semester, I decided to revisit one while covering the other. 
I did this by focusing my lesson on the plight of a pharmacist in 
search of an accommodation that would excuse her from doing 
part of her job, but in a variety of contexts and scenarios. The 
87. Id. at 1135. 
88. Laura E. Watson, (Un)reasonable Religwus Accommodation: The Argument 
for an "Essential Functions" Provision Under Title VII, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 70-71 
(2016); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 85, 89 (2016). 
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result has been a more thoughtful, productive class discussion 
about everything from changing attitudes toward religious 
liberty, to comparative developments and approaches toward 
religious liberty in the United States and abroad, to the 
differences between Title VII and the ADA. 
